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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amicus Curiae Docs4PatientCare is a nonprofit 501(c)(3) membership 
organization of concerned physicians committed to the establishment of a health 
care system that preserves the sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship, promotes 
quality of care, supports affordable access to all Americans, and protects patients’ 
freedom of choice.  It has an interest in this case because the individual mandate 
contradicts these fundamental principles and sets a dangerous precedent regarding 
the inappropriate use of federal power to dictate the choices of Americans. 
Amicus Curiae Benjamin Rush Society is a membership organization that 
includes medical students, residents, fellows, and doctors across the political 
spectrum — as well as members of the general public — who believe that the 
profession of medicine calls its practitioners to serve their patients, rather than the 
government. The Society believes that the physician-patient relationship is a 
voluntary and mutually beneficial one. Both parties have a right to enter this 
relationship freely. The proper role of government is to protect this freedom, not to 
diminish it.  The Society is part of the Pacific Research Institute.  The Society is 
interested in this case because the individual mandate undermines such freedom by 
compelling some individuals to purchase health insurance notwithstanding their 
free choice to contrary.  
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The Pacific Research Institute is a nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization that 
champions freedom, opportunity, and personal responsibility by advancing free-
market policy solutions to the issues that impact the daily lives of all Americans. 
And it demonstrates how free interaction among consumers, businesses, and 
voluntary associations is more effective than government action at providing the 
important results we all seek—good schools, quality health care, a clean 
environment, and economic growth.  Founded in 1979 and based in San Francisco, 
PRI is a non-profit, non-partisan organization supported by private contributions. 
its activities include publications, public events, media commentary, invited 
legislative testimony, and community outreach. 
This brief is being filed with the consent of all parties. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether the district court erred in holding that the minimum coverage 
provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Affordable Care 
Act” or “ACA”) is not a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power? 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The individual mandate cannot be constitutionally justified by the federal 
appellants’ claims that it regulates inactivity – the failure to obtain healthcare 
coverage – that nevertheless has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  While 
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appellants attempt to misdirect attention with gaudy (and questionable) numbers – 
50 million uninsured, $116 billion in annual consumption of healthcare by those 
uninsured, $43 billion of such care for which providers supposedly are not 
compensated – even assuming, arguendo, such numbers to be true they have little 
to do with, and are not cured by, the individual mandate.  Indeed, the federal 
government’s own analyses confirm that the individual mandate does not address 
the bulk of the alleged problem of uncompensated care, does not significantly 
reduce any costs absorbed or passed on by healthcare providers, and what little 
uncompensated care costs it might reduce does not have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce. 
Comparing the design and operation of the individual mandate with the 
nature of the uncompensated care alleged by appellants, there is a nearly complete 
disconnect (and sometimes a negative correlation) between the individual 
mandate’s effect on healthcare coverage and the provision of uncompensated care.  
The individual mandate at best only causes 16 million persons to obtain coverage 
they otherwise would forego.  A comparison of compensation rates for healthcare 
consumption by those 16 million persons with and without such coverage shows 
that the mandate will actually increase uncompensated care by pushing millions of 
uninsured into Medicaid (which generates a far higher rate of uncompensated care 
than do the uninsured on their own).  And even apart from the effects of increased 
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Medicaid enrollment, the mandate only even has the potential of act upon $1.2 
billion in genuinely uncompensated care from those 16 million people. 
In the context of the $2.42 trillion in total annual spending for healthcare, the 
trivial amount of uncompensated care affected by the individual mandate (even 
using the government’s own numbers) amounts to a mere 0.05% of total spending 
on healthcare and does not substantially affect the prices for healthcare or 
insurance.  Even assuming the alleged problem of uncompensated care in general, 
therefore, the individual mandate thus does not address that problem, may in fact 
worsen it, and thus cannot be constitutionally justified based on the utterly 
insubstantial effects on interstate commerce of the tiny fraction of uncompensated 
care upon which it potentially operates. 
In addition to the factual disconnect between the individual mandate and the 
uncompensated care alleged to justify it, the government’s constitutional theories 
concerning the effect of uncompensated care suffers a conceptual disconnect in 
that the bulk of such care is provided pursuant to charitable donation, government 
funding, or unfunded government coercion.  None of those things are commercial 
activities.  Charity is unilateral and non-commercial.  Government payment for 
medical care, whether directly through Medicaid or indirectly through grants to 
hospitals and the like, is a governmental activity, not a commercial one.  And 
government compulsion of genuinely uncompensated care creates costs imposed 
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by the government itself, not the recipients.  The commerce effects of such 
compulsion cannot be used to bootstrap the government to still further authority 
under the Commerce Clause. 
Finally, the government’s overall approach to the role that economic effects 
play in the application of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses is 
flawed in that it considers “economic” effects at too high a level of generality, 
neglecting the narrower and more particular scope of the constitutional term 
“commerce.”  Viewed at the government’s level of generality, everything about 
human existence is essentially economic, and all actions and inactions have an 
effect on the market and hence on commerce.  At that level of generality the notion 
of commerce and the limits of the Commerce Clause, are rendered meaningless. 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANTS VASTLY OVERSTATE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE AND THE ISSUE OF UNCOMPENSATED CARE. 
The federal appellants claim that 50 million uninsured annually consume 
$116 billion in healthcare, $43 billion of which is uncompensated, “i.e., care not 
paid for by the patient or a third party.”  Appellants Br. at 11 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 18091(a)(2)(F) and Families USA, Hidden Health Tax: Americans Pay a 
Premium, at 2, 6 (2009)); see also Appellants Br. at 2 (“$43 billion in 2008” in 
uncompensated care shifted to healthcare providers); id. at 10 (“approximately 50 
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million people” had no health insurance in 2009 and consumed “over $100 billion 
of health care services annually”) (citing Census Bureau Report, Income, Poverty, 
and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2009, at 23, table 8, and 
Families USA, Hidden Health Tax, at 2 ($116 billion in 2008)”).  That $43 billion 
purported cost of uncompensated care is supposedly shifted mostly to insurance 
companies, resulting in higher premiums for consumers.  Appellants Br. at 2.  Such 
shifting of costs into interstate commerce is then cited as a Commerce-Clause 
justification for the individual mandate, which purportedly will “reduce the 
uncompensated care obtained by the uninsured and paid for by other participants in 
the health care market.”  Id.  Congress itself offered the similar supposed 
justification that “that the consumption of health care without insurance has 
substantial adverse effects on the interstate health care market.  42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 18091(a)(2)(F). 
The federal appellants’ claim that the individual mandate is needed because 
50 million uninsured are shifting $43 billion in uncompensated-care costs, 
however, is misleading and grossly overstated.  Whatever effect other provisions in 
the Act may have on uncompensated care – a separate and separately contentious 
question – the individual mandate itself is unrelated to any significant impact from 
uncompensated care on the healthcare market. 
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As the federal government itself has recognized, the Act in its entirety will 
not result in universal insurance and will leave a substantial number of persons 
uninsured.  According to Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) projections, by 
2019, the Act as a whole will only generate coverage for 60% of an otherwise 
projected 55 million uninsured, with the individual mandate accounting for 
coverage of only 16 million  persons.  CBO, Analysis of the Major Health Care 
Legislation Enacted in March 2010, at 18 (March 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/121xx/doc12119/03-30-HealthCareLegislation.pdf 
(Table 3 showing estimates of coverage with and without the Act and a total 
reduction of only 33 million of the projected uninsured); CBO, Effects of 
Eliminating the Individual Mandate to Obtain Health Insurance, at 2 (June 16, 
2010), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/Eliminate_Individual_Mandate_06_
16.pdf (“eliminating the individual mandate … would increase the number of 
uninsured by about 16 million people”). 
In seeking to determine whether the individual mandate is justified by the 
supposed shifting of uncompensated care costs claimed to have a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce, it is only the uncompensated care targeted and affected by 
the individual mandate that should be relevant to the Commerce Clause analysis.  
The pertinent question, therefore, is the cost of uncompensated care that would 
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exist but for the mandate itself.  Translated back to the 2008 cost figures for 
uncompensated care, the amount actually at issue when considering the individual 
mandate is, at most, based on 32% of the 2008 pool of unemployed, or $13.8 
billion (32% of $43 billion in total costs of uncompensated care) in uncompensated 
care that might exist – and hence potentially provide the Commerce-Clause 
justification – absent the mandate.1 
Even that $13.8 billion is a substantial exaggeration of the purported effect 
on commerce from costs of uncompensated care supposedly targeted by the 
mandate.  The reason the figure is exaggerated is that the individual mandate does 
not eliminate the costs of uncompensated care even among those persons it causes 
to get coverage.  In fact, many of the persons affected by the mandate will receive 
as much or more uncompensated care even after they obtain coverage, will 
                                           
1 Because consumption and uncompensated care are based on the 2008 figures of 
50 million uninsured, we use that as the denominator when determining the relative 
consumption and uncompensated costs for the 16 million whose behavior changes 
due to the mandate.  For ease of calculation we have conservatively assumed that 
the per-person costs of uncompensated care are equally distributed among the 
uninsured.  However, as discussed below, infra at 13-15, that assumption likely 
overestimates the effect of the individual mandate on the amount of 
uncompensated care received by those whose behavior will be changed by the 
mandate.  Many of the 16 million uninsured pressed by the mandate into obtaining 
private or employer-based coverage likely consume less healthcare than the 
average uninsured, and likely paid out of pocket a higher than average percentage 
of their healthcare costs while uninsured.  Those persons thus consumed less than 
their pro-rata share of uncompensated care, and removing them from the pool of 
the uninsured will have a smaller impact in reducing uncompensated care. 
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consume more care than they would without coverage, will themselves pay less for 
such services, and will require governments and third parties to pay far higher total 
costs than if they were uninsured. 
To see how the mandate does not even address much of the problem 
purported to justify it under the Commerce Clause, it is necessary to examine the 
type of coverage the 16 million added insureds will obtain as a result of the 
mandate.  The CBO conveniently provides a breakdown:  of the 16 million persons 
who would be uninsured but for the mandate, the mandate will cause 4-5 million 
persons to obtain employer-sponsored coverage, 5 million persons to obtain 
individual coverage (including through the insurance exchanges created by other 
parts of the Act), and 6-7 million to obtain governmental coverage under Medicaid 
and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP).  CBO, Effects of Eliminating 
the Individual Mandate to Obtain Health Insurance, at 2.  Of particular interest is 
the 6-7 million persons who will be channeled into governmental coverage.  For 
those persons, the individual mandate will not substantially reduce the cost of 
uncompensated care because such coverage simultaneously increases their 
consumption of healthcare services yet systematically under-compensates 
providers for such services.  The result is that those persons shifted into Medicaid 
as a result of the mandate will continue to receive as much or more uncompensated 
care as they did when they were uninsured  
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It is well recognized that the uninsured consume approximately 50% less 
healthcare than do the insured.2  Once covered by government programs – under 
which they would pay little or nothing for healthcare – the newly covered can be 
expected to double their consumption.3  While such consumption will now be 
covered under Medicaid and CHIP, it is also well recognized that Medicaid 
                                           
2 Peter Harbage & Len M. Nichols, A Premium Price: The Hidden Costs All 
Californians Pay in Our Fragmented Health Care System, ISSUE BRIEF # 3, at 2 
(New America Foundation Dec. 2006), available at 
http://www.newamerica.net/files/HealthIBNo3.pdf (uninsured receive less than 
40% of the care received by the insured in California and nationally receive an 
average of 50% of the care received by the insured) (citing for the national figure  
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Research Findings #27: Health Care 
Expenses in the United States, 2000 (April 2004), available at 
http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/data_files/publications/rf21/rf21.shtml.); Jack Hadley 
& John Holahan, How Much Medical Care Do the Uninsured Use and Who Pays 
for It?” 2003, HEALTH AFFAIRS, at W3-69 to W3-70, available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2003/02/12/hlthaff.w3.66.full.pdf (full 
year uninsured received about half as much care as the privately insured). 
3 Much of the differential consumption is attributable to lack of access to and 
resources for health care, particularly for low-income uninsured.  For higher 
income uninsured, however, those choosing to forego insurance are, on average 
healthier, though the 50% consumption differential between insured and uninsured 
holds even controlling for health.  Jack Hadley, John Holahan, Teresa Coughlin & 
Dawn Miller, Covering the Uninsured in 2008:  A Detailed Examination of 
Current Costs and Sources of Payment, and Incremental Costs of Expanding 
Coverage, at 19 (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, August 
2008), available at  http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7809.pdf (“the uninsured 
use less care than the insured (holding health status constant), because they pay for 
much of their care themselves and because their health is generally better than the 
insured’s”).  Persons who would receive governmental insurance under the 
mandate, however, fall into the former group, with consumption likely a function 
of resources and having to internalize much of the cost of care.  Once they are 
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systematically underpays for healthcare services, on average paying only 72% of 
the amounts paid by Medicare, which itself pays only 80% of what is paid by 
private insurers.4  That amounts to Medicaid paying, on average, only 57.6% of 
private payers – a 42% underpayment.  Appellant HHS itself, however, places 
Medicaid payments at only 70% of private health insurance, a 30% underpayment.5  
That 30% to 42% underpayment for services provided to those brought into 
Medicaid as a result of the individual mandate represents as much or more 
uncompensated care as the 37% underpayment by the uninsured asserted by the 
                                                                                                                                        
under governmental coverage for which they do not have to pay, their consumption 
of healthcare that is now entirely free to them will rise. 
4 David Olmos, Mayo Clinic in Arizona to Stop Treating Some Medicare patients, 
Bloomburg, December 31 2009, (“Nationwide, doctors made about 20 percent less 
for treating Medicare patients than they did caring for privately insured patients in 
2007, a payment gap that has remained stable during the last decade”), available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aHoYSI84VdL0; 
Stephen Zuckerman, Aimee F. Williams & Karen E. Stockley, Trends in Medicaid 
Physician Fees 2003-2008 , Health Affairs, April 28, 2009, at w510 (Medicaid 
fees were only 72% of Medicare fees in 2008), available at  
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/3/w510.full.html;   Colorado Children’s 
Healthcare Access Program, Compare: Reimbursement for Medicaid Versus 
Commercial Health Insurance Versus Office Expenses, CCHAP Newsletter Three 
– Article 1, January 2007, at 2 (reimbursement rates for pediatric care routinely 
less than half of commercial rates and rarely above 80% of commercial rates), 
available at http://www.cchap.org/newsletter-three/#one. 
5 John D. Shatto & M. Kent Clemens, Projected Medicare Expenditures under an 
Illustrative Scenario with Alternative Payment Updates to Medicare Providers, 
Office of the Actuary, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, HHS, August 
5, 2010, at 5 (Figure 1) (Chart Showing Medicaid Payments 30% below private 
health insurance), available at 
http://www.cms.gov/ActuarialStudies/Downloads/2010TRAlternativeScenario.pdf. 
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government.  See Federal Appellants Br. at  10-11 (uninsured consume $116 
billion in healthcare services in 2008; $43 billion in uninsured healthcare services 
uncompensated).6 
Combining these numbers yields quite startling results that are wholly at 
odds with appellants’ claimed constitutional justifications for the individual 
mandate.  Assuming a midrange CBO figure of 6.5 million people as the number 
of uninsured that will obtain government coverage as a result of the individual 
mandate, an average annual healthcare consumption rate for the uninsured of 
$2320 per person (based on appellants’ own figures of $116 billion annual 
consumption divided by 50 million persons), and an average underpayment rate of 
37% for the uninsured (again based on appellants’ own numbers), those 6.5 million 
people would consume roughly $5.6 billion worth of uncompensated care if they 
were uninsured.  Once driven into governmental coverage by the individual 
mandate, however, their per-person consumption will double to $4640 annually 
and the underpayment rate will range from 30% to 42% resulting in their 
consumption of $9.0 billion to $12.7 billion worth of uncompensated care.  Thus, 
while the mandate will certainly provide those persons with more care, it actually 
                                           
6 The undercompensation rate for the uninsured according to the numbers in the 
federal appellants’ brief is thus $43 billion divided by $116 billion, or 37%. 
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increases the amount of uncompensated care they receive and the costs that are 
potentially shifted.  In medical terms the purported cure is worse than the disease. 
Returning to our analysis of the amount of uncompensated care addressed by 
the individual mandate, therefore, the uninsured whose behavior will be influenced 
by the mandate consume at best $13.8 billion in uncompensated care.  But those 
shifted into government coverage would continue to consume $9 billion to $12.7 in 
uncompensated care even after the mandate due to the consumption incentives and 
underpayment of the government programs.  The potential net effect of the 
individual mandate on the problem of uncompensated care is now down to, at best, 
a net $4.8 billion reduction in such costs – a far cry from the $43 billion effect on 
commerce claimed by appellants.  And using the higher estimate of 42% 
undercompensation by Medicaid, the individual mandate would only net a $1.1 
billion reduction in the cost of uncompensated care. 
Even the best-case scenario of a $4.8 billion reduction in uncompensated 
care from the uninsured influenced by the mandate continues to be too high.  As 
many have noted, and as the federal government in fact counts upon, those 
uninsured persons who will be pressed by the mandate into buying private 
insurance are in fact healthier on average and, by definition, wealthier than those 
eligible for government insurance.  They are thus unlikely to consume as much 
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healthcare when uninsured and are capable of themselves paying for a bigger 
portion of the healthcare that they do consume while uninsured.   
An analysis of the relevant data by other amici in this case notes that persons 
subject to the mandate – the young, healthy, and uninsured annually consume, on 
average, only $854 per person in healthcare rather than the government’s figure of 
$2320 per person.  See Brief for Amici Curiae American Action Forum and 
Economists in Support of Appellees/Cross Appellants and Affirmance, May 11, 
2011, at 13-14 & App. A.  Even continuing to assume that 37% of that amount is 
uncompensated care – far less likely at such lower consumption or among 
uninsured not poor enough to be eligible for Medicaid – those persons account for 
only $316 per person in uncompensated care for a total of $2 billion annually.   
Going back to our earlier estimates of $13.8 billion as the amount of 
uncompensated care attributable to those whose behavior would be changed by the 
mandate, recall that $5.6 billion was attributable to the low-income subgroup that 
would obtain Medicaid, leaving $8.2 billion in uncompensated care attributed to 
the non-Medicaid-eligible subclass under the government’s usage numbers.  But if 
this subgroup is indeed healthier and wealthier than average, consumes less than 
average, and hence is responsible for only $2 billion ($6.2 billion less than the 
earlier estimate), then the total pre-mandate uncompensated care for the 16 million 
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the mandate will influence is only $7.6 billion, and that becomes the upper limit of 
the mandate’s potential savings.  Given that shifting the poorer sub-group affected 
by the mandate to Medicaid will continue to generate at least $9 billion in 
uncompensated care, even under the more conservative estimate of Medicaid 
underpayment, the mandate would on balance increase uncompensated by $1.4 
billion.  And if the undercompensation from Medicaid is at the higher end of the 
range, the mandate would actually increase the cost of uncompensated care by $5.1 
billion.7 
Finally, it is worth noting that what appellants have described as $43 billion 
in uncompensated care is not in fact all uncompensated; at least not from the 
perspectives of hospitals.  Even the source relied upon by appellants, Families 
USA, recognizes that at least $1 4 billion or 33% of that amount is paid for by 
government grants.  Families USA, Hidden Health Tax, at 32 (Appendix Table 1).  
                                           
7 Even assuming that all 16 million of the uninsured influenced by the mandate 
consumed healthcare at the lower rate of $854 per person annually, that would 
mean that the group affected by the mandate consumed $13.5 billion in total 
healthcare only $5.1 billion of which was uncompensated when they were 
uninsured, holding the rate of non-compensation the same.  (16 million x $854 x 
0.37 = $5.056 billion.)  The group that would go to Medicaid then would account 
for $5.6 billion in total consumption and $2.1 billion in uncompensated care.  
Shifting to Medicaid would double their total consumption to $11.2 billion, for 
which Medicaid would undercompensate providers by from 30% to 42%, leading 
to uncompensated care of $3.4 to $4.7 billion.  Backing that amount out of the 
potential $5.1 billion reduction in uncompensated care leaves between $1.7 billion 
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Thus, at least 33% of the cost of uncompensated care discussed so far is not 
absorbed by private providers or passed on to insurance companies, but rather is 
paid by the government, no different than the care provided by Medicaid.  Such 
amounts are not properly included in the costs of uncompensated care supposedly 
borne and passed on by healthcare providers thereby affecting interstate commerce.   
A more recent study, however, noted that the Families USA figure 
overlooked numerous sources of government funding for otherwise 
uncompensated care and concluded that governments, rather than hospitals, 
actually pay for 75% of otherwise uncompensated care. Hadley, et al., Covering 
the Uninsured in 2008, at 50 (“government payments account for about 75% of the 
costs of uncompensated care”); id. at 51 (discussing numbers from Families USA 
and describing sources of government funds not included in their uncompensated 
care figures); see also Harbage & Nichols, A Premium Price, at 3 (“as much as 85 
percent of the costs incurred on behalf of the uninsured and underinsured are paid 
for by a combination of governmental subsidy programs”).8  That reduces the 
                                                                                                                                        
and $0.4 billion as the potential net impact of the mandate in reducing the cost of 
uncompensated care. 
8 We have not thus far discussed the costs of government payments for 
uncompensated care to the uninsured because appellants’ Commerce Clause theory 
has turned on the notion that it is the shifting of costs to private providers and 
insurers that exerts the requisite effect on interstate commerce necessary to invoke 
the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses.  But to the extent that the 
government funds care for the uninsured subject to the individual mandate, suffice 
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amount of uncompensated care costs borne by private providers and supposedly 
affecting commerce by 75%.  Such government payments reduce the amount of 
genuinely uncompensated care from $4.8 billion, supra at 13, to $1.2 billion.  That 
number would then be swamped by the increase in uncompensated care costs due 
to the mandate’s shift of 6.5 million people into Medicaid.  Those former 
uninsured would generate from $9 to $12.7 billion in uncompensated consumption, 
75% of which would presumably still be offset by indirect government payments, 
thus resulting in $2.3 to $3.2 billion in genuinely uncompensated care and hence a 
net increase in uncompensated care from the mandate of $1.1 to $2.0 billion. 
What all the preceding analysis amply demonstrates is that uncompensated 
care to the uninsured, and any supposed cost shifting that results therefrom, is an 
issue that has little or nothing to do with the individual mandate, is not 
significantly cured and may in fact be exacerbated by the individual mandate, and 
that even using the government’s own questionable numbers and conservative 
assumptions, the amount of genuinely uncompensated care that might be addressed 
by the mandate is at most $1.2 billion annually.  And that potential reduction 
                                                                                                                                        
it to say that the mandate, even with its penalty provisions, does not ameliorate 
such costs but in fact exacerbates them.  As the CBO has recognized, the 
individual mandate will impose a net cost to the federal government of $252 billion 
dollars between 2014, when it becomes effective, and 2020.  CBO, Effects of 
Eliminating the Individual Mandate to Obtain Health Insurance, at 1-2.  Such 
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would be more than offset by the increase in uncompensated care from shifting 6.5 
million people onto Medicaid.   
Aside from the offsetting increase from pushing more people into Medicaid, 
however, even the bare $1.2 billion of relevant uncompensated care pre-mandate is 
trivial in the context of national spending on healthcare of $2.4 trillion dollars,  It 
amounts to an inconsequential 0.05% of spending and certainly does not have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.  In fact, it is effectively a rounding error.  
Rather than the individual mandate being a means of addressing $43 billion in 
uncompensated care and supposed cost shifting that significantly affects 
commerce, it at best addresses a miniscule amount of costs that are unlikely to be 
noticed, much less shifted, in the context of interstate commerce in healthcare.  At 
worst, the mandate actually causes more uncompensated care than it purports to 
address. Nothing in such circumstances supports an invocation of the Commerce 
and Necessary and Proper Clauses based on the effects on interstate commerce of 
the uninsured covered by the mandate. 
                                                                                                                                        
costs overwhelmingly exceed any amounts the government may currently pay 
toward uncompensated care for those who are subject to the mandate. 
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II. APPELLANTS MISCHARACTERIZE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
UNCOMPENSATED CARE AND “COMMERCE.” 
Even apart from the lack of any substantial connection between the actual 
conduct affected by the individual mandate and the problem of uncompensated 
care, the relationship between any such healthcare and “commerce” is likewise far 
more attenuated than the federal appellants suggest.  As the federal appellants 
readily acknowledge, much of the reason people receive uncompensated care in 
times of need is because “[f]or decades, state and federal laws have required 
emergency rooms to stabilize any patient who arrives with an emergency 
condition, regardless of whether the person has insurance or otherwise can pay.”  
Appellants Br. at 8; see also id. at 35-36.  Even apart from such requirements, 
private doctors and hospitals would and do provide care to those without the means 
to pay out of humanitarian and charitable impulses.  Providing essential services 
without regard to financial means is, of course, laudable, just as providing food, 
clothing, and housing to the poor and homeless likewise reflects the compassion 
and generosity of so many in our society.  But such praiseworthy activity is best 
characterized as charity, not commerce.  Conflating the two strips away the well-
established line between economic and non-economic activities, reflected in the 
Constitution’s delimiting use of the word “commerce” itself, Supreme Court case 
law, tax code provisions regarding nonprofits and charitable deductions, and 
common sense.  See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
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(distinguishing commercial and non-commercial activities, even where the latter 
may have an effect on commerce); 501(c) corporations and deductions for 
charitable donations. 
The fact that many persons pay for the same services via a commercial 
transaction – whether through an insurance policy or out-of pocket – or can pay for 
some, though not all, of the services they receive, does not render the mere act of 
giving such services without compensation a commercial transaction.  Such giving 
lacks the bilateral nature of commerce properly understood, and is a unilateral 
response to a need, rather than an exchange. 
That such charitable giving of services may often be mandated by 
government edict or longstanding tort principles – and hence not always charity in 
the strict sense of a voluntary gift – does not alter this basic reasoning or render 
such giving commerce.  “Uncompensated” care funded by charitable donations to 
hospitals, clinics, and the voluntary donation of time by private doctors remains 
charitable, regardless whether further duties also compel such care.  And 
“uncompensated” care funded by government grants and subsidies likewise 
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remains charitable rather than commercial – it is merely the government that is 
choosing to provide such charitable resources.9 
That private charities or the government choose to fund or compel care for 
those who cannot afford it may well have economic effects on the market, but it is 
not itself commerce and does not shift costs to other participants in the commercial 
market.  Rather, those costs are born by those electing to give charity or by the 
government via taxing and spending.  But an effect on charitable decisions or 
governmental spending decisions is not an effect – substantial or otherwise – on 
commerce.  It is an effect on non-commercial categories of activity that does not 
readily fit within the category of “commerce.” 
Finally, to the extent that the government compels providers to provide 
uncompensated medical services they would not otherwise provide, the costs of 
those services are not being imposed or shifted by the recipients, but rather by the 
government itself.  In that instance it is the government that is imposing costs and 
potentially affecting commerce, not the underlying recipients of such services.  
                                           
9 Even if government spending on healthcare for those who cannot pay for it is not 
deemed charity, it would still not be commercial, but rather governmental in 
nature, no different from numerous types of government aid and even Medicaid 
itself.  Government spending must be viewed as something different than private 
commerce insofar as it is subject to the different constitutional authority for the 
government to tax and spend for the general welfare, and conflating it with private 
commerce would collapse much of the distinction between those two sources of 
and limits on federal power. 
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Attributing those costs to the recipients of government-coerced care, and then 
claiming Commerce-Clause authority to preemptively regulate all potential future 
recipients of coerced care a result, is disingenuous bootstrapping.  The cause of any 
economic distortion is the government itself.  The federal government cannot 
expand its own authority by manufacturing the circumstances of uncompensated 
care and claiming that such circumstances now affect interstate commerce.  There 
is no limit to the Commerce Clause if the federal government can attribute the 
consequences of its own conduct to citizens who have engaged in no commercial 
transactions. 
III. APPELLANTS PRESENT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN “ECONOMIC” ACTIVITY 
AND “COMMERCE” AT TOO HIGH A LEVEL OF GENERALITY FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSES. 
Finally, amici offer a brief observation on the federal appellants’ conflation 
of broadly conceived economic principles of supply and demand with the 
necessarily narrower constitutional concept of “commerce.”  Taken to extremes, 
amici suppose that all attributes of human existence could be described in 
economic terms in that they create (or fail to create) demand for various goods and 
services broadly defined.  Life necessarily entails both needs and desires – 
demand, at least in the abstract.  We need food, water, and shelter to live.  We 
desire numerous goods and services to improve our condition or fulfill our goals – 
education, companionship, information, entertainment, luxury.  Sometimes such 
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demand is met and sometimes not.  Sometimes we supply the demand ourselves or 
with our family, sometimes others meet the demand.  Sometimes we are simply 
given the things we need or want – by friends, generous strangers, the government 
– and sometimes we obtain that which we need or want as part of an exchange.  
Only the latter means of fulfilling our needs and wants can even begin to be 
considered “commerce” in the constitutional sense of an affirmative transaction 
involving the exchange of goods, services, or money.  A unilateral gift of services 
is not such an exchange and is not commerce.  While the federal government may 
deem such limitations and others to be overly formalistic and claim that all means 
of meeting demand and even the failure to create demand have effects on the 
economy, the law must recognize the necessity and propriety of such formalisms.  
The Constitution and the Supreme Court have drawn certain distinctions that 
must be respected, notwithstanding what the government might think.  Because the 
Constitution limits the federal government’s power to regulating “commerce,” 
there must be a category of behavior that is not commerce.  Because the Supreme 
Court has distinguished between commercial and non-commercial activities, 
notwithstanding attenuated upstream or downstream effects on the economy, this 
Court should likewise do the same.  Charity, like many other activities, is not 
properly deemed a “commercial” activity.  Similarly, this Court also should follow 
the Supreme Court in its consistently limited application of the Commerce power 
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to the regulation of affirmative activities, rather than mere inactivity or the 
inchoate potential for future activity.  Failure to draw such limits on the theory that 
economic effects transcend all such formalistic boundaries would abandon the very 
formalities inherent in the written constitution from which government – including 
the courts – gain their legitimacy.  “That way there be dragons.” 
Under the federal appellants’ view, mere existence is inevitably economic in 
nature and has an effect (positive or negative) on virtually all markets.  Regardless 
whether such a high level of generality in considering markets and economics is 
plausible as an academic exercise, it is unacceptable as a constitutional theory.  By 
its very words, the Commerce Clause and the case-law surrounding it presuppose 
and require a much lower level of generality that gives meaning to each of the 
distinctions described above.  If the mere incidents of existence are economic, then 
everything is economic, everything affects commerce, and the Commerce Clause is 
an empty shell. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, this Court should affirm the decision below insofar as 
it declares the individual mandate unconstitutional and declines to sever it from the 
remaining provisions of the Act. 
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